Coercive subtyping o ers a general approach to subtyping and inheritance by introducing a simple abbreviational mechanism to constructive type theories. In this paper, we study coercion completion in coercive subtyping and prove that the formal extension with coercive subtyping of a type theory such as Martin-L of's type theory and UTT is a conservative extension. The importance of coherence conditions for the conservativity result is also discussed.
Introduction
Coercive subtyping, as introduced and studied in Luo97, Luo98] , is a new general approach to subtyping and inheritance for constructive type theories such as Martin-L of's intensional type theory NPS90] and the type theory UTT Luo94] . Introducing a simple abbreviational mechanism into the logical framework (the meta-language used to specify type theories), it provides a uniform framework that generalises the traditional approaches to subtyping { that based on the notion of subset or inclusion (eg, between even natural numbers and natural numbers) and that based on projection (eg, between record types). Applications of coercive subtyping that have been studied so far include (1) 
its practical use in
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large-scale proof development Bai98] based on the implementation of coercions Bai96, Sai97] in proof systems such as Lego LP92] and Coq Coq96], (2) its application in the study of natural language semantics (conceptual analysis of mathematical vernacular LC98b] and lexical semantics LC98a]), and (3) its use in the design and implementation of strong functional programming language (work in progress at Durham).
This paper studies the meta-theory of coercive subtyping, based on the more general formulation in Luo98]. We focus on the issue of coercion completion and conservativity, one of the key meta-theoretic properties for coercive subtyping. Based on the basic meta-theoretic results presented in JLS98], we show that the formal extension of coercive subtyping is a conservative extension of the original type theory, and hence justify that it is a truly abbreviational mechanism. The result is proved for a large class of basic subtyping rules, including those for parameterised inductive data types covered by inductive schemata, under the condition that the basic subtyping rules are coherent. We also discuss the importance of the coherence conditions (uniqueness of coercion) in the context of proving conservativity results.
The conservativity proof is di cult. It is partly due to the complexity of the dependent type system that is studied. More importantly, the di culty comes from the fact that with coercive subtyping, it is necessary to consider coercion completion (the process of coercion insertion by means of an algorithm) based on the structure of derivations rather than terms or judgements. The main theorem, that the coercion completion map is total, shows that every derivation in the calculus extended by coercive subtyping can be transformed into a derivation in the original type theory (without subtyping). The result not only justi es the adequacy of abbreviational mechanism of coercive subtyping, but provides a further justi cation of the practical implementations of coercions in proof systems.
In Section 2, we give a formal description of the system with coercive subtyping, which is essentially the same as that presented in Luo98] , and introduce notations and general rule forms considered in the meta-theoretic development. The issue of conservativity (and its relationship with coherence conditions) is discussed and explained in Section 3, where we also give a informal discussion on the main results and the methods used in the meta-theoretic development. Section 3 contains also several basic meta-theoretic results about substitution, weakening, presupposed judgements and transitivity elimination. Section 4 gives the de nition of the coercion completion map and presents main results about its properties. Conservativity results that follow from the results about coercion completion may be found in Section 5.
Coercive subtyping and subkinding
The systems considered in this paper are extensions of the typed logical framework LF. LFis presented as in Luo94] and in the paper Luo98], with minor modi cations. For the reference purposes, its rules may be found in the ap-pendix.
We consider a type theory T speci ed in LFand study its extensions with coercive subtyping. Transitivity and congruence for subkinding. 
Coercive rules
The extension of T with coercive subtyping, the system T R], is obtained from T R] 0K by adding the following rules, which establish the essential connection between the original system T and its subtyping/subkinding extension.
New rules for application
Coercive de nition rule
Methods and results
Coherence and conservativity
We consider in this paper the conservativity problem, one of the main problems when an approach to coercive subtyping as an abbreviational mechanism is taken.
The issue of conservativity is closely connected with that of coherence of coercions (uniqueness of coercion between given subtype and supertype), as it is seen from the following example: take f:(x:K)K 0 and a:K 0 , where K 0 < c K 0 . By coercive de nition rule, f(c(a)) = f(a). If there is another coercion K 0 < c 0 K such that c 6 = c 0 (assume c; c 0 be the terms of T), then one may derive that f(c(a)) = f(c 0 (a)), and, with appropriate f and a, c(a) = c 0 (a) and c = c 0 . If the whole system has su cient logical power it may merely become inconsistent. (For example, let c be the embedding of a copy of Nat into Nat used in the de nition of the type Even and c 0 the one used to de ne Odd.)
As one may see from this example, the interaction of the powerful coercive rules and coercions, if the latter are not coherent, may be dangerous. Conceptually, one may require coherence of the basic coercions, but non-conservativity may arise if any derived coercions are not coherent. Clearly, there is a problem how the conditions that are imposed on basic coercions are connected with the behaviour of arbitrary coercions. This problem is much complicated by the fact that the coercions in question may be themselves derived using coercive rules.
The purpose of this work is to show how coherence conditions do imply conservativity.
The notion of conservativity in this context requires an explanation, since
T R] is evidently not conservative in literal sense: the expressions like f(k) where f:(x:K)K 0 , k:K 0 and K 0 < c K are not in general well-typed terms of T. The use of such expressions is justi ed by the use of coercions as an abbreviational mechanism and this form of non-conservativity should be allowed. One way to understand the conservativity problem is based on the assumption (to be proved) that one may distinguish coercive application from the ordinary one without ambiguity if it is known that the judgement is derivable in T R] (in particular that an application cannot be coercive in one derivation and ordinary in another). Conservativity then means that every judgement (not of the subtyping or subkinding form) that is derivable in T R] and does not contain coercive applications, is derivable in T.
Another possibility is to use alternative formulation of coercive rules:
\dot"marks coercive applications). Conservativity may be understood in conventional sense, that a judgement that is not subtyping or subkinding and doesn't contain \dot" is derivable if and only if it is derivable in T.
The results obtained in this paper will provide solution to the conservativity problem in both variants. In particular, it will be proved, that the calculus with \dot" is equivalent to the calculus without dot (in the sense that there is one-to-one correspondence between derivations).
Basic meta-theoretical results
As the technical background, we use several results from our earlier paper JLS98]. ?`f:
Assume that there exist some T-derivations of the premises ?`f: (x:K)K 0 and ?`k: K 0 , and a T-derivation of the judgement ?`c:(K 0 )K. Now we obtain a T-derivation as follows:
Coercive equality application rule and coercive de nition rule could be modi ed in the same way. This construction suggests an idea how to de ne a transformation (we call it ) on the whole derivation. We should begin from the top, and move to the bottom replacing subkinding judgements in the premises of coercive rules CA.1, CA.2 and CD by the derivations of their coercion terms, and modifying the rules accordingly. The intended result is a T-derivation for the judgements which are not subtyping or subkinding else a derivation in its conservative extensions T R] 0 or T R] 0K respectively. This idea will work, only if it is possible to guarantee, that the premises of all rules will be matching (at least, up to the equality in T). Note, that even the identical kinds or terms may be modi ed in di erent ways in di erent derivations, since di erent coercion terms could be inserted. This is one of the places where the coherence conditions are to be used.
For example, if we consider the ordinary application rule ?`f:
and assume that some T R]-derivations of its premises, say, d 1 ; d 2 became the derivations (d 1 ); (d 2 ) in T of ? 0`f0 : (x:K 0 1 )K 0 2 and ? 00`k00 : K 00 1 respectively, then the corresponding kinds in ? 0 and ? 00 should be equal in T, and the same for K 0 1 and K 00 1 . If they are T-equal, there is a canonical way to insert a Tderivation of the corresponding equality (or equalities), and then use the same rule as in main derivation.
By we denote the operation that inserts \dot" where coercions are to be inserted. Formally, it replaces the rules CA:1; CA:2; CD in d by CA:1 0 ; CA:2 0 ; CD 0 respectively.
The problem with is that in advance there is no garantee that \dots" will be inserted at the same places if there are several occurrences of the same expression in di erent premises of a rule.
In our study of coercion completion we consider also the transformation that inserts coercion terms in the derivations where coercive applications are already marked by \dot".
Coercion completion and conservativity proof
Let us outline shortly the structure of conservativity proof based on coercion completion. Main technical results are contained in section 4.
In the subsection 4.2 we de ne the operations , , , used in coercion completion. The de ninition, in addition to the idea of inserting the coercion terms (or \dots") in place of coercive applications, uses the idea that after the insertion the premises of ordinary rules are to be \adjusted" (using T-equalities), in order to make possible the use of the same rule. At this stage , , are de ned as partial operations, since it is not yet proved that one may always derive in T the necessary equalities. In the subsection 4.3 we show that in a sense the operations of , , agree with the algorithms considered in the theorems 3.1 and 3.2. For example, if for some derivation d the derivation (d) is de ned (it doesn't contain coercive rules), and is any of the algorithms considered in the theorems 3.1, 3.2, then ( (d)) is also de ned, and the nal judgements of (d) and ( (d)) are equal in T (componentwise). In the subsection 4.4 we prove that , , are total. Main idea: if there is a rule with several premises, their matching parts may be considered as presupposed judgements of the premises. If ( , ) are de ned for the premises, one may use the results of previous section to show that after the use of these operations the premises are still matching up to T-equality.
Coherence of coercions in T R] 0K (corollary 3.4) is also used here.
Totality of , , permits us to prove equivalence of the systems with and without \dot", and nally to prove conservativity. In short, we may prove that if a judgement without \dots" has a derivation d in T R], then this judgement is not changed by insertion of coercions in d, while d becomes a T-derivation.
Some assumptions.
The technique we use in the proof of conservativity is very general, in particular, it doesn't depend on any assumptions about normalization properties and covers subtyping rules usually connected with inductive types, but it also has some limits. It is important, for example, that for any rule with several premises the condition of its applicability could be expressed in terms of identity of certain presupposed judgements of these premises.
This holds for speci cations in such type theories as UTT or Martin-L of intensional type theory. Precise general conditions (as close as possible to \i ") on the type theory T and on the system R of basic subtyping rules such that conservativity of T R] w.r.t. T takes place is for us still an open problem, though we have reasonnable su cient conditions. To avoid lengthy technical formulations, the reader may assume that the rules of T are those of UTT or of the Martin-L of intensional type theory.
One has also some su cient conditions for basic subtyping rules (i.e., rules, that constitute R). In short, the reader may think, that the basic subtyping For example, the coercions between inductive types generated by the coercions between their parametric types (see Luo98]) may be described in this way, and closed terms above will be closures of some terms built from elimination operators and variables.
In the example 2.1, one of the closed terms used in the rule will be the closure of the following term: E ( 
Coercion Completion and its Properties
In this section we de ne operations , and , used in coercion completion and present the main results leading to the results about conservativity in the end of the paper. 4.2 De nition of , and .
We de ne , and on the class of derivations, including substitutions, the rules wkn, context-retyping 3:3 etc. In principle, how a judgement is modi ed depends on its derivation. De nition of is very simple. Thus, transforms ordinary derivations into derivations with \dot". If \dots" in di erent premises of some R were inserted at di erent places in the occurrences of the same expression, may be not de ned.
is the transformation (coercion completion) that inserts coercions into ordinary derivations (coercive rules disappear).
inserts coercions into derivations in the system with \dots", but in all other respects its de nition reproduces literally the de nition of .
In di erence of , we cannot require matching of the premises up to identity, since inserted coercion terms from di erent branches may be equal and not identical even if the places where they should be inserted coincide.
is de ned by structural induction, and the de nition includes the assumption (routinely veri ed) that the form of the judgement is not changed. if J K 1 < c K 2 then c; K 1 ; K 2 ; any subkinds of above mentioned kinds. The A; B; c; k; k 1 ; k 2 will be called term-constituents and the rest kind-constituents of ?`J. These constituents will be considered as di erent in di erent occurrences (e.g., labelled by occurrences). Note that we do not consider proper subterms as constituents.
Presupposed judgements are principal example of the judgements built of constituents of some main judgement that we are interested in.
When some derivation d of a judgement ?`J is given, and (d) is de ned, it will determine also unique syntactic transformation of all constituents of ?`J. Let d (?`J) be the nal judgement of (d). Let ? 0`J0 be any judgment (not necessarily derivable) where ? 0 is obtained by kinding of free variables by kind-constituents of ?, and J 0 one of possible forms of judgements built of kind and/or term-constituents of ?`J. We shall denote by d (? 0`J0 ) the result of replacement of each constituent of ?`J which was used in ? 0`J0 by the corresponding part of d (?`J). Similar notation applies to ; .
The following results hold with obvious modi cations for , (in case of one has to consider syntactical identity of nal judgements instead of ). In such a case one step of elimination is de ned by This elimination step is divided naturally into two parts. Schematically, Here h i denote appropriate T-derivations obtained from the T-derivation of equalities (+). Before r may be applied to the conclusions of (e 0 i ), some T-equalities must be incerted. They are obtained by modi cation of the T-equalities used in (d 1 ). Those T-equalities are (a) the equality judgements used to change kinds of the variables in ei (?) (their context is part of e1 (?)) and (b) the equalities of the form e1 (?); :::` ei (K) = e1 (K 0 ). The equalities (a) may be used without modi cation. To the equalities of (b) wkn must be applied rst: 
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